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NIO # 1887-74

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

23 August 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE CHAIRMAN, UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD  
SUBJECT : Dissemination of and Handling of Sensitive  
Intelligence Materials  
REFERENCES : A. USIB-D-9.1/25, 14 May 1974, subject  
as above  
B. S-65, 448/DS-6C2, 12 July 1974,  
subject as above

1. Admiral de Poix raises a number of points in Reference B which, as I understand it, were the subject of considerable discussion and debate during the USIB Security Committee's Survey (a thorough and well done piece of work). We in the NIO fraternity reviewed various draft versions and in sum found them to be responsive to the task levied on the Committee by you with the exception of Recommendation No. 2 which I will presently address.

2. Our feeling concerning Recommendation No. 1 coincides with that of the Committee -- there is a real need to reduce the dissemination of National Intelligence Estimates, particularly now that the NIOs are attempting to make them more responsive than ever to the needs of the policy makers. In essence, though Admiral de Poix's memorandum does not reflect an understanding of it, Recommendation No. 1 does nothing more than reaffirm the system which historically and currently has been in use, i.e., the number of copies each USIB agency receives was determined in conjunction with the ONE Staff and is now decided in coordination with the action NIO.

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
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3. I am also in agreement with the Security Committee's rationale for Recommendation No. 2 for restricting dissemination of NIEs overseas, but agree with Admiral de Poix that the NIOs should not be superimposed on the departmental determination of which overseas installations should receive copies. As the Security Committee points out, however, there is need for assurance from the USIB agencies that adequate review of these disseminations is involved to ensure that the number actually sent overseas is kept to an irreducible minimum. I thus agree with Admiral de Poix's recommendation for deletion of the phrase in Recommendation No. 2.

4. Regarding Admiral de Poix's suggested wording for Recommendation No. 6, I again find myself in agreement with the Security Committee's rationale and recommendation. The need to restrict the distribution of NIEs to those who have a real need to see, and hopefully utilize them in their work, in my view, far exceeds the benefits derived by their use by students in military and civilian training facilities. I believe their absence from these facilities would, perforce, go unnoticed by the trainees in very short order. Because of the overriding security considerations, I concur in the Security Committee's recommendation.

5. In sum, I recommend that you approve the Security Committee's Report of Survey -- overriding Admiral de Poix's suggestions for Recommendation No. 1 (which, as noted above, is nothing more than a reaffirmation of existing procedures but with a tightening of dissemination) and Recommendation No. 6 (which does not really solve the problem of access to NIEs of those who do not have a real need-to-know). I suggest that Admiral de Poix's deletion in Recommendation No. 2 be accepted.



for George A. Carver, Jr.  
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

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